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The principle of horizontal equity (HE) is considered as a basic principle to follow in order to design and 
evaluate a redistributive policy. However, the theoretical debate has not yet clarified what exactly 
horizontal equity is. In this paper we aim to clarify the meaning of the principle of HE and its normative 
content. In particular, we establish the true status of the two fundaments of the principle of HE, defining 
what is meant by 'equals' and then treating these 'equals' 'equally'. Our analysis brings forth a new and 
more appropriate definition of the principle of HE. 
Introduction 
The principle of non-discrimination is widely acknowledged as a fundamental normative 
principle in the design and implementation of public policies. In the US Constitution this 
principle is formalized by the 'equal protection clause', maintaining that the laws of a 
State must treat in the same way all individuals in equal conditions and circumstances. In 
the context of fiscal policies, the non-discrimination principle is identified by the principle 
of horizontal equity (HE), which claims that a redistributive policy should provide a 
fiscally equal treatment of 'equals'. 
Scholars can glean much about the meaning and operationalization of HE from 
Richard Musgrave (1959, 1976, 1990) and from more recent works by Louis Kaplow 
(1989, 2000), Peter Lambert (1998, 2004) and others, which address philosophical, 
methodological and measurement issues. However, there are many unresolved issues still 
surrounding the HE notion, and more in general surrounding the non-discrimination 
principle. As some scholars have recently pointed out (e.g. Auerbach and Hasset 1999; 
Kaplow 1989, 2000), the theoretical debate has not yet clarified the properties and the 
normative content of this principle. 
A fundamental unsolved problem concerns the exact meaning of horizontal equity. 
What is the principle of horizontal equity? What is its normative content? What does HE 
ask of scholars and policy-makers? As Auerbach and Hasset argue, 'From Musgrave 
(1959) on, there is a general agreement that horizontal equity is important, but little 
agreement on quite what it is' (1999, p. 1). A second and related question about 
horizontal equity concerns its normative support. Why should we care about this 
principle? Does it have a firmly grounded normative basis, as pointed out by Musgrave 
(1990), or does it have no normative support whatsoever, as suggested by Kaplow (2000)? 
This question calls for a conclusive answer. Indeed, as Kaplow observes, any application 
or measurement of HE would be meaningless or even harmful for policy-makers if HE 
were indeed a bad normative principle: 'Horizontal equity should not be measured and 
new measures of social welfare should not be deployed until we know what we are trying 
to measure and why' (Kaplow 2000, p. 22). 
In this paper we propose a systematic analysis of the concept of horizontal equity, 
giving a comprehensive picture of the fundamentals and suggesting a clear-cut way to 
understand the relevant issues. Our contribution is twofold. First, we make clear the 
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exact, and perhaps counter-intuitive, meaning of horizontal equity. Second, we analyse 
the normative issues related to HE. In the process of clarifying the concept of horizontal 
equity, we are indebted to some philosophical intuitions highlighted by Peter Westen 
(1990) in his treatise about the concept of equality. 
Our basic reasoning is as follows. Any policy must necessarily select some individual 
characteristics to be considered as 'relevant' for the redistributive process (the so-called 
'identification problem'). This selection is a sufficient condition to justify subdividing the 
population into groups of individuals defined as 'equals'. As we show, a policy cannot 
treat in a discriminatory way the individuals it defines as 'equals'. This means that 'equal 
treatment' of individuals defined as 'equals' is not a normative problem, but a condition 
that is always satisfied by any policy. The definition of 'equals' is a normative choice 
exactly because it selects those individuals who will be treated equally and those who will 
not. Since a certain policy may violate horizontal equity only if 'equals' are defined in a 
'normatively non-appropriate' way, whereas there is no normative problem in the 'equal 
treatment' of 'equals' once they are properly defined, the principle of horizontal equity 
should be redefined as follows: 'Individuals treated equally by a policy should be those 
who are deemed normatively as equals.' 
From this analysis it follows that the normative debate should focus on the 
'appropriate' definition of 'equals' from a normative point of view, rather than on 
whether or not horizontal equity is a good or bad normative principle (which is the main 
issue tackled by Musgrave 1990 and Kaplow 2000). 
Some important implications follow from this analysis with respect to the meaning of 
the measurement of horizontal inequity (HI). In recent decades several indices have been 
proposed in order to measure if and to what extent HE is violated by a certain fiscal 
policy or reform. (For a broad survey, see Lambert 1998.1) But most of these works do 
not pose a crucial question about the meaning of the measurement of HI. Our paper 
shows that that the proper role of an HI index is to measure the extent to which a policy 
deviates from a criterion of HE (that is to say, from a definition of 'equals') that is 
different from the one adopted by the policy under examination. Therefore tax analysts 
should clearly specify why they adopt a certain definition of 'equals' and should justify it 
from a normative point of view. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section we analyse the identification 
problem (the definition of 'equals') and the 'treatment of equals'. In Section II we make 
clear the meaning of horizontal equity. Finally, in Section III we draw some concluding 
remarks. 
I. Selection and Treatment of 'Equals' 
The principle of HE claims that a policy should treat 'equals' 'equally'. A question 
immediately arises from this formulation: who are the 'equals'? As a matter of fact, two 
individuals are never 'equals' in all possible senses, but only with respect to some selected 
variables. This means that the definition of 'equals' requires choosing a set of variables 
considered as 'relevant' for the definition itself. Hence a straightforward definition of the 
principle of HE is the one proposed by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980): 'The principle of 
horizontal equity states that those who are in all relevant senses identical should be 
treated identically' (p. 353). The selection of the relevant variables to define 'equals' is 
clearly a normative choice, as outlined also by Atkinson and Stiglitz: 'The implementa- 
tion of this principle raises several issues. The first is the definition of "relevant" . . . there 
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is undoubtedly scope for differences of opinion, and historically standards have altered' 
(Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, p. 353). 
An example may be useful to clarify the normative problem existing in the selection 
of the relevant variables. Suppose that a redistributive policy must be designed for a 
population of three individuals (A, B and C). Individuals A and B have an income 
of 100, whereas individual C has an income of 50. Furthermore, suppose that individuals 
B and C suffer from bad health, whereas individual A has good health. Assuming 
that income is a relevant variable, should health be considered a second 'relevant 
variable'? If the answer is 'no', then health will not be considered as a variable 
deserving attention with regard to the redistributive aim. It follows that individuals A 
and B, who are characterized by the same income but different health conditions, will be 
considered 'equals'. Furthermore, the inequality between individuals A and B will be 
considered only in terms of their income, and not also in terms of their health. If instead 
'health' is considered a good reason for discriminating among individuals, it will be 
selected as a relevant variable: A and B will not be considered as 'equals', and the 
inequality between A and C will be evaluated in terms of their health as well as their 
incomes. This example shows how the selection of the relevant variables has clear 
normative implications with respect to the relative fiscal treatment of the individuals in a 
population. 
Another typical example concerns the choice of the household equivalence scale when 
designing an optimal income tax. As pointed out by Lambert, 'Household equivalence 
scales are typically invoked to identify the equals (and unequals), a value judgment which 
becomes centrally important for the analysis' (2004, pp. 1-2). 
All in all, the choice of the relevant variables providing a definition of 'equals' is a 
normative choice, and any policy selecting the variables considered as 'relevant' refers 
explicitly or implicitly to a normative criterion. Now, since in the design implementation 
or evaluation of any policy the normative problem to select 'equals' is inevitably faced, 
one should follow the following general normative principle: the selection of 'equals' 
should be made considering all and only those variables that are 'normatively 
appropriate' for the redistributive process. Obviously, different value judgments may 
suggest different ideas of what 'normatively appropriate' means. Below we will better 
understand the normative meaning of the selection of 'equals'. 
We can now provide a formal definition of 'redistributive policy' and analyse how a 
redistributive policy treats individuals defined as 'equals'. We distinguish between a 
'theoretical' policy and an 'actual' one. By 'theoretical policy' we mean the one emerging 
from a given design of the government (i.e. the formal rules as they are written in codes 
and laws) and needing to be implemented; by 'actual policy' we mean the one emerging 
from the actual implementation of a theoretical design. This distinction is relevant as 
long as the actual outcomes differ from the desired theoretical ones because of wrong or 
illegal behaviour of the individuals that a given policy addresses (e.g. tax evasion) and/or 
of the bureaucratic system that implements the designed policy. 
Suppose that at time 0 a theoretical redistributive policy is designed by the 
government in a community of TV ^ 2 individuals. At time 0 each individual i, where 
i = 1, . . . , TV, can be identified on the basis of the values assumed by her Q 'individual 
characteristics', where QeJf and Jf is the set of natural numbers. Then we can define Q 
sets Xq C Jt, where q = 1, . . . , Q and Sft is the set of real numbers, each composed of all 
the values assumed by the qth characteristic in the population at time 0. Moreover, we 
define the set of these sets: X = {Xu ... , XQ}. A theoretical redistributive policy is a 
double selection made by the government: 
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1 . the selection of a set of relevant variables, i.e. Z observable individual characteristics, 
Z^Q, that the government considers as relevant for the redistributive process; 
according to this selection, a subset of X is defined Xz = {X\, . . . , Xz}',2 
2. the selection of a redistributive function3 f: D - > C, where D = X\ x • • • x Xz, C = 
X\ x • • • x Xz and A^z C Sft (z = 1, . . . , Z) is the set of all the values (or probability 
distributions of the values) 'theoretically'4 assumed by the zth characteristic in the 
population at time 1, that is to say after the design of the redistributive policy. 
Hence a theoretical redistributive policy can be seen as a selection of two distinct 
elements: some 'relevant variables' and a 'redistributive function'.5 Both selections result 
explicitly or implicitly from the formal laws and codes as designed by the government. 
Now suppose that at time 0 a theoretical redistributive policy (as defined above) is 
implemented by the government. We define as 'actual redistributive policy' a double 
selection emerging from the implementation of a theoretical policy: 
1. the selection of a set of actually relevant variables, i.e. SeJ^ individual characteristics, 
where 5< Q, as 'actually relevant' when a given theoretical policy is implemented. The 
set of the S 'actually relevant' characteristics may differ from the set of the Z 
characteristics resulting as relevant in the theoretical design. According to this 
selection, a subset Xs of X is defined; 
2. the selection of an actual redistributive function g: D' - > C, where D' = X\ x • • • 
x Xs, C = X\ x -" Xs and Xs c 5R, with s = 1, . . . , S, is the set of all the values 
actually assumed by the sth characteristic in the population at time 1, that is to say 
after the implementation of a given theoretical redistributive policy. 
Given the selection of the relevant variables, two individuals characterized by the 
same values of these selected variables are defined by the policy as 'equals in all relevant 
senses', whereas two individuals differing in one or more characteristics are defined as 
'unequals'. This means that, whatever relevant variables are selected, two individuals 
defined as 'equals in all relevant senses' are represented by the same element in the 
domain of the redistributive function. Hence, by the same definition of function, two 
individuals selected as 'equals in all relevant senses' cannot be discriminated between. 
This means that any policy must necessarily treat 'equally' the individuals it defines as 
'equals in all relevant senses'. 
This result could appear counterintuitive. Indeed, it seems plausible that a 
redistributive policy can treat individuals defined as 'equals' in a discriminatory way. 
However, the following simple reasoning will persuade the sceptics. Suppose that a given 
redistributive policy defines two individuals as 'equals in all relevant senses' according to 
a certain selection of the relevant variables, and suppose ad absurdum that these 
individuals reach two different outcomes after the design of the policy. How can this 
redistributive policy discriminate between them? Which individual will obtain one 
outcome and which individual the other? The only possible answer is that this policy is 
discriminating on the basis of one or more initial characteristics that are not considered 
in the selection of the variables according to which they are considered as 'equals'. 
However, by selecting a different set of relevant variables, the redistributive policy is 
defining 'equals' in a different way with respect to the initial definition (reductio ad 
absurdum). It follows that a redistributive policy can discriminate only between two 
individuals defined as 'unequals'.6 The same result is pointed out by Westen (1990) in his 
philosophical analysis of the concept of equality: 'Every rule treats "equals" "equally" 
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because every rule necessarily prescribes identical treatment for the persons it defines as 
identical' (Westen 1990, p. 125). 
One could object to this conclusion by referring to the case of a random policy, e.g. 
random assignments of income transfers to individuals. Indeed, one could argue that in 
this case two individuals defined as 'equals' could reach two different outcomes ex post 
because of different random draws from the lottery implemented by the redistributive 
policy. But also in this case, the individuals discriminated by the random policy cannot 
be logically defined as 'equals'. Indeed, a random policy includes among the relevant 
individual variables the random draws obtained by the individuals from the lottery. 
Therefore, two individuals identical in all the other relevant senses but differing in their 
lottery outcomes are defined as 'unequals', and for this reason can be discriminated 
between. 
In conclusion, any redistributive policy (whether theoretical or actual) treats 'equally' 
the individuals it selects as 'equals in all relevant senses'. Obviously, when a theoretical 
redistributive policy is implemented, it is possible that the actual outcomes differ from 
the desired theoretical ones. This means that an actual policy can treat differently 'equals 
in all relevant senses' as defined by the theoretical policy. It is straightforward that this is 
possible only if the set of the actually relevant characteristics is different from the set of 
the theoretically relevant characteristics. 
II. The Meaning of Horizontal Equity 
When is horizontal equity violated by a policy? This question is quite ambiguous. Indeed, 
the classical definition of HE states that 'equals' should be treated 'equally', but it does 
not specify if such 'equals' are those defined by the policy under examination or the 
'normatively appropriate equals'. However, our previous analysis suggests that the only 
meaningful way to think of horizontal inequity is the latter. Indeed, if we assume that 
'equals' are those defined by the policy under examination (hence considering as 'solved' 
the related normative problem), there is no way to obtain horizontal inequity. In such a 
case, horizontal equity should be considered as a property always satisfied by any policy 
and not as a normative principle. It is instead meaningful to adopt a different view of 
horizontal inequity, summed up in the following statement: 
Horizontal equity is violated by a policy when 'equals', as defined by selection of all and only the 
normatively relevant individual characteristics, are discriminated between by that policy. 
We can now understand the conditions under which a policy generates horizontal 
inequity. Suppose that there exists a certain definition of 'equals' deriving from the 
'normatively appropriate' selection of the relevant variables. Suppose that all the other 
definitions of 'equals' are 'non-appropriate' from a normative point of view. In the 
previous section we argued that any policy treats 'equally' the individuals it defines as 
'equals'. This means that a certain policy (theoretical or actual) can treat in a 
discriminatory way the 'normatively appropriate equals' only if that policy provides a 
different definition of 'equals'. Therefore, since horizontal inequity can emerge only if 
'equals' are defined by selecting a 'normatively non-appropriate' set of individual 
characteristics, the only normative problem existing in the 'equal treatment' of 'equals' 
consists in the definition of 'equals'. 
Notice that the selection of the 'normatively appropriate variables' is not a strictly 
necessary condition for a policy to be horizontally equitable. Suppose that a policy 
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considers as relevant all and only the normatively appropriate variables y. In this case it 
is possible that some 'normatively appropriate equals' will be treated unequally by the 
policy. But this may not be so; for example, it is possible that not all individuals differ 
with respect to the variable y. However, it is worth pointing out that, if we want to 
guarantee that 'equals' as defined in a normatively appropriate way are treated 'equally' 
by a policy, regardless of the distribution of the characteristics in the population or the 
redistributive function, then the selection of the 'normatively appropriate relevant 
variables' becomes a necessary condition as well. Obviously, it is possible that a 
theoretical policy does not violate horizontal equity but that the corresponding actual 
policy does so. This can happen only if the definition of 'equals' provided by the actual 
policy is different from the theoretical definition and the latter is normatively appropriate 
whereas the former is not. Nevertheless, the contrary is also possible. Take for example 
an apartheid regime, where black people are fiscally discriminated against but they refuse 
to pay taxes that exceed the amount levied on white people. In such a situation one would 
probably agree that selection of the 'actually relevant' variables is more justified from a 
normative point of view than selection of the theoretically relevant ones. 
The previous analysis allows us to argue that the principle of HE as traditionally 
stated (that 'equals should be treated equally') is misleading. Indeed, it presumes that 
there are two normative problems: the first (which is generally underestimated) is the 
definition of 'equals'; the second is that of horizontal equity, would consist in the 'equal 
treatment' of 'equals'. However, as we have shown above, once the first problem is 
solved, the second disappears. Indeed, once the 'normatively appropriate equals' are 
selected by a certain policy, the individuals so defined cannot be discriminated between: 
this policy is necessarily horizontally equitable. Therefore, the only normative problem 
concerns the definition of 'equals', and the only meaningful normative claim is that 
'equals' should be defined by selecting all and only the 'normatively appropriate' 
characteristics. 
Let us now point out the normative meaning of the selection of 'equals'. The logical 
result obtained in the previous section, i.e. that individuals defined as 'equals' by a policy 
are necessarily treated 'equally' by that policy, can be re-formulated as follows: the 
individuals that a policy treats 'equally' are those identified as 'equals'. Hence the 
normative content of the selection of 'equals' (i.e. of horizontal equity) is clear: when a 
policy selects the 'relevant variables', it is choosing which individuals have to be treated 
'equally' and which individuals can be discriminated against. 
In conclusion, the normative problem of horizontal equity consists in the definition of 
individuals that are to be treated 'equally' and not in the 'equal treatment' of 'equals'. 
Accordingly, the principle of HE should be redefined as follows: 
The individuals treated equally by a policy should be those who are deemed normatively equals. 
III. Concluding Remarks 
This paper aims to clarify the meaning of horizontal equity. Our first claim is that 
selection of the variables providing a definition of 'equals' is a normative choice. 
Furthermore, since individuals defined by a policy as 'equals' are always treated 'equally' 
by that policy, the 'equal treatment' of 'equals', once they are defined in the normatively 
appropriate way, is not a normative problem. However, a policy may create horizontal 
inequity when, defining its 'equals' in a normatively non-appropriate way, it treats 
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differently 'equals' defined in the appropriate way. This means that the principle of 
horizontal equity should be redefined as follows: 
The individuals treated equally by a policy should be those who are deemed normatively equals. 
Our analysis allows us to understand the meaning of the use of an HI index. 
Technically, such an index could be useful in determining whether, and to what extent, a 
given redistributive policy discriminates between two individuals considered as 'equals' 
according to a selection of the relevant variables different from the selection made by that 
redistributive policy. Alternatively, an HI index may be used to measure whether and to 
what extent the actual redistributive policy discriminates between 'equals' as defined by 
the theoretical redistributive policy, and whether and to what extent a different 
implementation would decrease or increase this measure. 
Concerning the normative meaning of an HI index, the analysis developed above 
suggests that an HI index reveals a true violation of horizontal equity only if the 
definition of 'equals' given by the policy under examination is not 'appropriate' from a 
normative point of view, whereas the definition of 'equals' provided by the researcher is 
appropriate. Therefore, a researcher aiming to test whether and to what extent horizontal 
equity is violated by a policy should justify from a normative point of view (i) why the 
definition of 'equals' provided by the theoretical (or actual) policy is not appropriate, and 
(ii) why the definition of 'equals' proposed by the researcher is normatively appropriate. 
It follows that the measurement of horizontal equity is not only a statistical issue but also 
a normative problem. Moreover, our reasoning suggests that another sensible empirical 
exercise may consist of inferring the definition of 'equals' implicit in a certain 
redistributive process in order to evaluate its normative appropriateness.7 
Our analysis shows that the normative debate should focus on the problem of 
selecting the individuals a policy should treat 'equally' and not about whether or not a 
policy should treat the 'equals' equally (which is a meaningless view of horizontal equity). 
As Peter Westen points out, 
It follows that the controlling question will always be 'which rule, of the many available rules, is 
the one by which people ought to be measured and compared?' That, however, is a question for 
which answers must be sought not in conceptions of equality (which coincide with, rather then 
precede, the formulation of rules), but in external theories of justice and justification. (Westen 
1990, p. 125) 
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NOTES 
1. New indices have been recently proposed by Lambert and Ramos (1997), Dardanoni and Lambert (2001) 
and Auerbach and Hasset (2002). 
2. For notational convenience, and without loss of generality, we assume that the variables selected as 
relevant are ordered as the first Z among the Q individual characteristics. 
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3. This function may be deterministic or random. It is random when there exists at least one redistributed 
characteristic that is a random variable in the co-domain, so that the elements of the co-domain are 
random vectors. The redistributive function is deterministic when it is not random. 
4. These values are only 'theoretically' and not 'actually' assumed. Indeed, any theoretical policy needs to be 
implemented, and the outcome resulting from the implementation may differ from the theoretical one. 
5. In the context of taxation, this means the choice of a tax base and the selection of a tax schedule, 
respectively. 
6. This result is not surprising: any social discrimination is based on the belief that some individuals are 
morally different because of one or more characteristics (e.g. race, sex, ideology). 
7. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this point. 
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